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Abstract
While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly
in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach
breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment
approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind
(emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must
still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific
findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the
strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is
supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded
cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.
Resumen
La teoría de la cognición corporeizada se separa de una ontología cartesiana basada en el sistema modular. Las ventajas
del enfoque de la corporeización son: a) enraiza la cognición en la experiencia modal, b) está en armonía con una
filosofía materialista de la mente (materialismo emergente), y c) está respaldada por la investigación experimental en
varios campos. Sin embargo, la corporeización todavía debe dar cuenta de las abstracciones, los malentendidos teóricos
(representación vs. no representación) y los hallazgos neurocientíficos que desafían la relevancia de las propiedades
sensoriomotoras en los procesos cognitivos. Mientras que la versión fuerte de la corporeización se ve seriamente
desafiada por los retos conceptuales y fisiológicos, su versión débil es respaldada por evidencia convincente. Sugerimos
que la investigación futura se centre en las bases psicofisiológicas de la cognición corporeizada y redirija los esfuerzos
hacia el campo de la correspondencia intermodal.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to work through some of
the ideas, approaches, and limitations of the embodi-
ment approach, taking into account both experimental
research and philosophical notions. We also explore the
traditional “mind-as-a-computer” approach, the weak or
graded embodiment approach (cognition requires some
sensorimotor activation) and the strong embodiment ap-
proach (cognition cannot occur without sensorimotor ac-
tivation), while comparing them with elemental findings
in neuroscience and physiology. By returning to classi-
cal neuroscientific research, cross-modal correspondence
experiments, and various concepts within the philosophy
of mind (psychophysiological monism), we believe that
we can clarify and enrich theoretical discussions. To this
end, we seek to demonstrate that embodiment is cur-
rently the most suitable theoretical framework in which
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cognitive processes can be explored.
In recent years, there has been a growing tendency
to conduct psychological research under an embodiment
approach instead of the traditional ‘mind-as-a-computer’
approach. Barsalou (1999) found that cognitive processes
have sensorimotor properties to some extent and require
modal perception. Gallese and Lakoff (2005) also argue
that knowledge itself is inherently embodied; that is, it is
mapped and processed within the human sensory-motor
system. These authors add that our sensory-motor sys-
tem provides structure to conceptual content, and charac-
terises the semantic content of concepts (see also Lakoff,
2014). According to some strong versions of this view,
the act of imagining is a simulated form of action or per-
ception, using many of the same sensory-motor networks
(Gallese, 2003). Conversely, Fodor (1983) and Fodor
and Pylyshyn (1981) propose a “mind-as-a-computer”
approach, where peripheral cognitive processes are di-
vided into modules that are independent of modal per-
ception. From this perspective, concepts are conceived
of as abstract and amodal entities that are represented
in some “language of thought” (Fodor, 1975). This view
holds that concepts are denoted by symbols and have the
properties of productivity and compositionality (Gallese
& Lakoff, 2005). As Chemero and Silberstein (2008)
posits, thoughts (propositional attitudes) are relation-
ships between people and mental representations that
stand for things in the world (their semantic proper-
ties). In this sense, any theory that takes cognition to
involve semantically assessable internal entities is a form
of representational theory of mind. While embodiment
approaches are not necessarily anti-representationalist,
radical approaches often are. This foray into embodied
cognitive science appears to have began with the work
of (Brooks, 1991) but there is also the claim (Chemero,
2009) that Gibson (1979), Barwise and Perry (1983) also
have much to contribute to this domain.
There have been a great number of experimental
research studies and theoretical discussions in the con-
text of embodiment approaches, but there are still some
points that call for clarification. Embodiment is a term
assembled from a vast array of inter-disciplinary concep-
tions and variants and because of this, confusion and
contradictions are to be expected. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to organise the arguments and current evidence in
favour of the embodiment approach.
2. Modular system versus embodiment
In years gone by, the properties of cognitive processes
were thought to differ from physiological processes in the
brain (Cartesian ontology). This tradition can be traced
back to rationalist thinkers such as Descartes and Leib-
niz. Today, remnants of their theories continue to emerge
in current cognitive sciences. There is still considerable
resistance to acknowledging that cognition can be linked
with the body in the same way as other physiological pro-
cesses. Such resistance can be found in recent literature
from Mahon (2015) and Mahon and Caramazza (2008),
who argue that cognition is a phenomenon too complex
to be explained by embodiment, primarily because their
research does not seem to show a perfect connection
between sensorimotor areas and higher cognitive pro-
cesses. However, this evidence could only be used as a
case against strong embodiment, which proposes that
sensorimotor areas can sufficiently explain higher cogni-
tive processes (Gallagher, 2005; Shapiro, 2014). Another
problem with rejecting some types of embodied cognition
is that there are no other testable hypotheses to study
cognitive processes experimentally. The modular system
(Fodor, 1983) or the computer analogy would be one
of the most consistent theoretical frameworks against
embodied cognition. Instead of proposing that bodily
experience is the fundamental element that defines cogni-
tion, this framework proposes that symbols are in fact its
foundation. This view holds that concepts are analysed
based on formal abstract models that are completely
unrelated to body and brain regions that govern inter-
actions with the environment (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).
However, current evidence shows that higher cognitive
processes are not necessarily built on symbols, and that
they can be grounded in the measurable activation of
synapses (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996).
A further problem with the modular system is that
by nature it is largely epistemological. As science de-
mands, material objects and events are studied through
hypotheses that can be tested empirically (Bunge, 1999;
Popper, 2005). This statement might appear somewhat
rudimentary, yet this is precisely the problem with the
modular system. By taking this empirical and often ster-
ile approach, measurements are produced that can be
inconclusive or at best highly questionable. Instead, the
embodiment approach offers more methodological possi-
bilities for experimental and psychometrical testing due
to its congruence with a more mechanistic vision of the
mind. The following sections will illustrate this by clar-
ifying some of the fundamental concepts and problems
within the embodiment approach.
3. Grounded experience
The terms grounded experience or grounded cognition
are used almost interchangeably. Despite its apparent
simplicity, the term “grounded” requires clarification. In
this context, “grounded” implies that cognitive phenom-
ena such as memory, cognition, reasoning, social ranking,
and even moral values are mostly mediated and shaped
by our everyday life experience (Barsalou, 1999, 2008;
Gibbs, 2006). This understanding is a radical departure
from the “mind-as-a-computer” approach. Grounded
cognitive processes are a return to the ideas of Hume,
Berkeley, and other English empiricists, who suggest that
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the only experiences or impressions of reality we have
are acquired through our senses (Hume, 1904). However,
grounded experience does not suggest that Locke’s tabula
rasa is an acceptable position. There is also evidence that
monkeys and non-human apes are capable of grounding
their experience by creating metaphorical maps of their
social groups, associating time with space dimensions,
or showing sensorimotor brain activation when seeing
their peers perform different tasks (Dahl, Rasch, Tomon-
aga, & Adachi, 2013; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000; Merritt,
Casasanto, & Brannon, 2010; Sigala, Gabbiani, & Logo-
thetis, 2002). In humans, another example of grounding
can be found in cross-linguistic research, which shows
that the understanding of some concepts (e.g. emotion)
is closely related to the perception of physical space
(Montoro, Contreras, Elosúa, & Marmolejo-Ramos, 2015;
Salgado-Montejo et al., 2016). Therefore, it is reasonable
to hypothesise that, while some elements of human cogni-
tion are more or less universal, they are still grounded in
a material reality. The majority of these findings discard
the modular system in order to work with an embodiment
approach. Further, the modular system is better under-
stood as an integrated set of areas that work together
in cognitive processing. Grounded cognitive processes
will consequentially produce grounded concepts, mean-
ing that their symbolic components are not as relevant
(as suggested by computationalism). For example, the
concept of time is an abstraction in and of itself but,
expressed linguistically, is a concrete object: “we have
time”, “we are running out of time”, or “I do not enjoy
my time here”. In these examples, time is grounded as
a “thing”, and is experienced as if it were an object or
event (for more examples see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980;
Marmolejo-Ramos, Khatin-Zadeh, Yazdani-Fazlabadi,
Tirado, & Sagi, 2017, for a recent proposal see).
4. Embodied experience
By definition, embodiment means that all cognitive
processes have sensorimotor properties (Barsalou, 2008;
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2006). The paradigm of
embodiment was initially studied as part of phenomenol-
ogy. Husserl, Heidegger, and particularly Merleau-Ponty
(1942/1967) suggested that the body was an object some-
how attached to the rest of the empirical world, and that
experience was intrinsic to the body. Thus, phenomenol-
ogists rejected a symbolic interpretation of experience
(Shapiro, 2014). It is difficult to know with more detail
what phenomenology means using terms such as object,
Dasein (being there), or the flesh, due to its obscure
writing and the exclusive use of introspective qualitative
methods (see Brown, Cromby, Harpe, Johnson, & Reavey,
2011, for an example). Despite these origins, the embod-
iment approach has evolved significantly in the past 20
years to the point that we can now understand embod-
iment as a crucial part of phenomenology. As Beaton
(2016), says: “An externalist account of perceptual expe-
rience actually matches our first-person phenomenology
better than any non-externalist account ever could. This
is relevant because I am comparing direct realism to
representationalism and to radical constructivism, each
of which, in its own way, denies that external objects can
play any constitutive role in experience.” (Beaton, 2016).
Embodiment that is more weak or graded in nature ar-
gues for more nuanced terminology such as “convergence
zones”, “modal content”, and “gradiations in grounding”
(see Chatterjee, 2010; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, &
Vigliocco, 2012).
This idea that bodily states define the posibilities
of mental action is not new; it was examined by James
(1894) over a century ago. Since we cannot detach from
our bodies, it stands to reason that there are no grounded
experiences without embodied experiences. Therefore,
our grounded experiences are being mediated at some
point by our sensorimotor system. Despite the volume
of evidence, the embodiment approach can still be ques-
tioned in that sensorimotor activation does not always
occur (see Binder & Desai, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza,
2005).
Embodiment challenges the “mind-as-a-computer”
metaphor of cognition in that, to have proper cogni-
tive processes, an organism must have a body. As Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) argue, computers do not have bodies.
Therefore, they cannot develop authentic cognition or,
at least, a form of cognition that would resemble that
of humans. If cognitive processes are indeed part of the
body like any other physiological mechanism, there is
little merit beyond pedagogic purposes in using com-
puter analogies or borrowed concepts (e.g. encoding,
computations, information or modulation).
The relationship between body and environment is
the intersection where grounded cognition and embod-
iment meet. The environment presents the objects or
events that can be perceived by the body, as Gibson
(1979) argued rather extensively. Ecological perception
is a theory that embraces embodiment and embedded-
ness, giving the environment a predominant role in cogni-
tion. The possibilities of our cognition are limited by our
environment, body mechanisms and brains (Chemero
& Silberstein, 2008). However, there are traces of the
modulatory system at work when hypotheses create a
dichotomy between the body and the brain, as if they
were isolated entities (see Fodor, 1983; Goldinger, Pa-
pesh, Barnhart, Hansen, & Hout, 2016; Mahon, 2015).
This is not only a return to a Cartesian ontology, but
also a contradiction of elemental human anatomy and
physiology (Boulpaep et al., 2009). Since body and brain
are a series of subsystems that interact with each other,
there is no way to understand the function of one with-
out the other, nor is there a possibility to understand
modules (if they in fact exist) that evolve without taking
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into account the environment.
5. Relationship of embodiment with the
identity hypothesis (emergent materialism)
So, the question can then be asked: what type of philoso-
phy of the mind best fits graded or weak embodiment? It
could be argued that the identity hypothesis (also known
as psychophysiological monism) is a potential answer.
This hypothesis suggests that psychological processes
can be explained via physiological and environmental
activity, and that the properties of the mind are the same
as the properties of the body (Bunge, 1980). There are
two variants of this hypothesis: eliminative materialism
and emergent materialism. They both have their simi-
larities – namely, that they view cognitive processes as
entities dependent on the brain, and that these processes
should not be viewed as merely metaphysical or isolated
from bodily functions. However, they also have their
differences.
Eliminative materialism claims that everything men-
tal can be explained via physiological structures, and
that any psychological phenomenon is a result of inade-
quate categorical explanation (folk psychology). Hence,
it suggests that cognitive sciences should focus only on
the measurable and atomised brain parts that are re-
lated to any example of what we refer to as psychological
phenomena (for a deeper review, see Churchland, 1989;
Dennett, 1991). There are two major problems with this
approach. Firstly, eliminative materialism follows the
same theoretical path as radical behaviorism (Skinner,
1977); that is, there is no body-mind issue because there
was no mind (“mental organ”), and all important stimuli
are external to the body. Under this approach, there is
no possibility of building a theory of cognition or to un-
derstand physical behavior as part of a cohesive system.
The second problem is that eliminative materialism as-
sumes that internal and atomised biological, chemical, or
physical explanations have a sufficient degree of causality
to explain psychological phenomena. This notion does
not appear to explain cognitive processes as a whole. It
also does not encourage psychological or physiological re-
search since, according to eliminative materialism, there
is theoretically no such thing as mental phenomena.
Emergent materialism consists of three principles
that suit the embodiment approach, at least in its weak
or graded version: a) all cognitive processes are states
or events that happen in the brain and body; b) these
processes are emergent relative to those of cellular com-
ponents of the brain; and c) psychophysical or psychoso-
matic relations are interactions between different brain
subsystems (neural connections) and the rest of the body
(Bunge, 1977, 1978). The link between the embodiment
approach and emergent materialism (or identity hypoth-
esis) lies in their common interest in studying emergent
properties without abusing the concept of causality. They
do not see the body and the mind as separate entities,
nor do they believe that the properties of cognition are
reduced to isolated (or even non-existent) components.
Rather, they believe the interaction within different body
systems are what we define, in folk psychology, as cog-
nitive processes. However, emergent materialism is a
hypothesis, not a theory, because it lacks concrete pre-
dictive power in particular situations. By this definition,
experimental research is able to offer a more thorough
theoretical definition of embodiment.
Embodiment also aligns with emergent materialism in
its epistemological dimension, as it studies material enti-
ties such as the brain, the senses, and the nervous system,
while not limiting itself to symbols or behaviour. In this
sense, it salvages the best of traditional behaviourism (i.e.
the need to study observable objects and events) and the
best of classical cognitivism (i.e. not reducing cognition
to properties and functions that are indestinguishable).
Therefore, the embodiment approach is compatible with
a philosophy of the mind that offers deeper opportuni-
ties for research, as opposed to the Cartesian-embedded
understanding of the “mind-as-a-computer”.
We can then conclude that there is no need for ex-
treme reductionism by atomising cognition, as proposed
by eliminative materialism. Rather, cognition can be
studied as a system without major complications. For
example, we can study the stomach or intestines indi-
vidually, or the digestive system as a whole. We can
study entire ecosystems, or the particular species that
compose them. We can study the orbit of the planet, or
the entire movement of the solar system. By the same
token, we can study brain areas or biochemical reactions
either separately or as part of wider interactions that
include the whole human body, all without losing any ex-
perimental or theoretical rigour. Despite the congruence
that the embodiment approach has with a more empiri-
cally testable philosophy of the mind, shortcomings still
remain.
6. Current limitations
Due to its sensitive experimental nature, the embodiment
approach has its advantages when carrying out empir-
ical research, particularly in the case of psychometric
research (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard,
2008). However, it is only beginning to answer questions
within cognitive science, and it is not a concrete solution
to the mind-body problem. As it fails to align with
traditional cognitive approaches, embodiment tends to
be categorised as an “umbrella” term in current research
contexts. Thus, these limitations must be overcome in
order to achieve a better explanation of the mechanisms
related to cognition.
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6.1 Abstract concepts
As Barsalou (2008) suggested, there is a need for further
research that links sensorimotor properties to abstract
concepts. The sensorimotor theory aims to demonstrate
that perception is directly related to understanding. It
argues, firstly, that we can perceive only what we can
understand; and secondly, and more strongly, that percep-
tion is an active process of understanding our engagment
with the world. It is important to note that, in this
approach, there is no intermediate thing called “expe-
rience” that understanding engages with; experience is
the active engagement of understanding. Note also that
the “understanding” in question is not an abstract, intel-
lectual understanding; but rather a more fundamental,
procedural knowledge, including the crucial knowledge
of how to act and interact (Beaton, 2016).
Some studies have demonstrated clear links between
concrete and abstract domains by asking participants to
perform various body movements, or to place valenced
objects in space (positive items go “up”, negative items
go “down”). This has been shown to have an effect on
memory, emotional state, and semantic space processes
(Casasanto, 2009; Salgado-Montejo et al., 2016; Vigliocco,
Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004). Lakoff and Johnson
(1980) proposed that something as abstract as metaphors
can be grounded in bodily experience. In this field of
research, Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) demonstrated
the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between
space and time. This indicates that people find it easier
to create metaphors of time by mapping properties from
the space concrete domain to the time abstract domain,
rather than the other way around. Margolies and Craw-
ford (2008) also linked emotional valence with metaphors
of time that described movement. Eskine, Kacinik, and
Prinz (2011) even found that moral and political judge-
ment can be modulated by gustatory taste. (Casasanto,
2008) showed that stimuli placed closer in space were
rated as more similar during conceptual judgment and
less similar during perceptual judgment. These findings
further reinforce the notion that cognition is embedded
and embodied. In order to understand how concepts
are created, we need to understand the relationship of
the body and the environment rather than symbolic
representations created in “modules”.
This body of research supports the embodiment ap-
proach due to its high level of behavioral and mechanistic
explanations. However, there are still many abstract con-
cepts that must be tested in order to understand the
extent to which embodied cognition can explain phenom-
ena related to the mind. Additionally, the physiological
mechanisms involved in transforming concrete knowledge
to abstract knowledge are still generating much debate.
Further research is needed that relates embodiment and
abstract concepts to perceptual and motor modalities in
order to give stronger support to the sensorimotor prin-
ciple. It appears that neuroscientific research supports
the weak embodiment hypothesis (see Meteyard et al.,
2012, for a review). Whether conceptual processing is
abstract or concrete, cognitive processes are simulated in
the brain before being manifested as behavior. Neverthe-
less, this event needs to be studied further at a synaptic
level, as reducing all abstract concepts to sensorimotor
brain areas contradicts other findings (Chatterjee, 2010).
For a recent discussion in regard to embodiment and
abstract concepts see Borghi et al. (2017).
6.2 Theoretical fragmentation
Embodiment has a range of implications. The most ob-
vious proposition is that all cognitive processes happen
in the body, and there is no abstract “mind” activat-
ing cognition. While perhaps simply a truism to some
(Goldinger et al., 2016), it is a source of ongoing debate
within the embodiment literature, as there is no clear
consensus on what mechanisms are involved in embodied
cognition and their dynamics at a neuronal level. How-
ever, the embodiment approach has been successfully
applied to a wide range of psychological and neurological
phenomena (see Shapiro, 2014, for a review). Radical
and graded embodiment (Chatterjee, 2010; Varela, 1996),
enactivism, simulations, external cognition, and extended
cognition (Gover, 1996; Wilson, 2002) are all concepts
found in the embodiment literature, either in isolation
or opposition. Hence, the embodiment approach must
solve its conceptual ambiguity to become a legitimate
theory that explains and predicts cognitive processes.
We suggest embarking on a research path that encom-
passes experimental psychophysiology and cross-modal
correspondences (that is, the compatibility effect be-
tween dimensions of a stimuli and different modalities)
as a potential avenue to counter conceptual fragmenta-
tions. The psychophysiology of crossmodality studies
brain mechanisms, their interactions with the rest of the
body, the environment-senses, and sense-sense interac-
tions (see Spence, 2011, for a review). There has been
an increasing interest in the effect of synaesthetic con-
gruency on multisensory information processing (Evans
& Treisman, 2009; Gallace & Spence, 2006; Makovac &
Gerbino, 2010; Parise & Spence, 2008) and cross-modal
metaphors (Marks, 2004). A large body of research has
indicated that people exhibit consistent cross-modal cor-
respondences between different stimuli that imply very
different sensory modalities. For example, people consis-
tently match high-pitched sounds with small, bright ob-
jects that are located high up in space (Salgado-Montejo
et al., 2016; Spence, 2011). There is no need to propose
more ‘computational models’, where the concepts tend to
be obscure, immaterial, and reliant on external behavior.
As Bunge (1980) puts it, behavior is only the “tail” of
the whole body-environment interaction.
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6.3 Representations vs. non-representations
The concept of representation is unclear in both cognitive
and embodiment literature. There is no precise consensus
as to whether representations are images, simulations,
abstractions, bodily experiences, or even images of un-
experienced objects (see Harnad, 1990, for a discussion).
Therefore, differences among embodiment approaches
are most likely due to conceptual misunderstandings (see
Gentsch, Weber, Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Schütz-Bosbach,
2016, for a review). This has split the embodiment
approach between those who defend representations –
or weak embodiment (Alsmith & De Vignemont, 2012;
Barsalou, 1999; Goldman, 2012); and those who reject
them completely – or strong embodiment (Chemero, 2009;
Gallagher, 2005; Shapiro, 2014). However, much of this
conceptual confusion can be avoided by simply applying
a neuroscientific perspective to the problem. The repre-
sentational embodiment view proposes that the brain is
the most relevant mediator of cognitive processes, while
the non-representational embodiment view proposes that
musculoskeletal structures alone provide sufficient feed-
back for cognitive processes to arise (Gallagher, 2005).
Furthermore, it argues that there is no need for represen-
tations to mediate between external and internal parts
of the system, and that the perceptual system and its
related physiological components is all that is required
(Chemero, 2009; Gibson, 1979).
As most body movement is mediated by the brain,
the representational embodiment view appears to hold
the greatest consistency with elemental human physiol-
ogy (Agur & Dalley, 2009; Augustine et al., 2008). This
view is also supported by experimental findings (Cardona
et al., 2014; Gallese et al., 1996), where activation in
the motor areas of the brain has been documented in
tasks related to movement, emotion, and language. The
non-representational embodiment view not only has con-
sistency problems in relation to basic anatomy, it is also
highly speculative. Arguably, the non-representational
embodiment view could claim that basic reflexes consti-
tute an example of peripheral sensory organs, as they
provide sufficient feedback to automatically and uncon-
sciously execute movement in the absence of semantic
representation. For example, reflex circuitry can mediate
the withdrawal of a limb that has been exposed to a
painful stimulus. Stimulation of nociceptive receptors
leads to the activation of local circuits at the medullary
level, causing withdrawal of the limb. While withdrawal
happens before we become aware of pain, the reflex path-
way receives input from several different sources. Thus,
under certain conditions, descending pathways can sup-
press withdrawal from painful stimuli.
Higher cognitive functions that are largely executed
by the brain’s frontal lobe cannot be explained by the
extension of cognition to peripheral structures (Augus-
tine et al., 2008; Frith & Dolan, 1996), so it is important
to rigorously define which physiological mechanisms are
directly related to cognitive processes. If we follow the
logic of the non-representational embodiment view, what
then are its conceptual limitations? Can we say that di-
gestion, breathing, or cardiac regulation are components
of cognitive processes? Cognition, like other psychologi-
cal terms, lacks a physiologically-defined concept, which
leaves the term open to speculation. That said, the non-
representational embodiment view does seem to be useful
in the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence (see Clark,
1997, 1998; Clark & Chalmers, 1998).
6.4 Brain injuries and neuroplasticity
According to Mahon (2015), due to a lack of evidence
in patients with brain damage embodied cognition is
not a paradigm worth embracing. Studies have shown
that patients who suffered damage did not lose cognitive
skills related to the affected area, at least not severely
(Binder & Desai, 2011; Chatterjee, 2010; Mahon & Cara-
mazza, 2005). Because these findings seemed to suggest
little connection between brain activity and cognitive
processes, they were used to critique the embodiment
approach. However, this statement begs clarification on
three accounts: a) the brain is a system that inherently
seeks to compensate for injuries (Cardona et al., 2014;
Price & Friston, 2002); b) there is extensive research that
presents evidence in favor of brain plasticity (Augustine
et al., 2008); and c) the embodiment approach allows for
the possibility that cognitive processes engage various
parts of the body, not only the brain (see Freund et al.,
2016).
Glenberg (2015) also addressed these critics by ex-
plaining that the modal system does not have a rela-
tionship with any one brain area, but is distributed via
synapses around the brain. This is congruent with the
bulk of neuroscientific research showing that when a
brain area suffers an ablation, other areas compensate
for the damage (Augustine et al., 2008; Goldman, 2012).
There is also evidence to suggest that embodiment and
cross-modality are universally linked, even if subjects
do not show explicit symptoms. For example, a study
focusing on vision-touch synaesthesia found that the
somatosensory cortex was activated when participants
observed a human face or neck being touched, both in
those with and without synesthesia (Blakemore, Bris-
tow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005). Further research on
the relationship between cognition and cross-modality
is required, not only to understand the relationship be-
tween specific brain areas and cognitive processes, but
to understand how they work together systematically,
especially when damage has occurred.
7. Conclusion
While computer-based cognitive theories are certainly
useful in the study of human behaviour and artificial in-
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telligence, they are still entrenched in Cartesian ontology.
Hence, they are not the most suitable way in which to
view cognitive processes. On the other hand, the embod-
iment approach incorporates elements ideal for cognitive
research, such as grounded cognition, empiricism, physi-
calism, and experimental research. This approach also
dovetails with the concept of emergent materialism. We
believe that weak embodiment offers the most compelling
evidence towards this new paradigm, while strong embod-
iment is problematic from both conceptual and physiolog-
ical standpoints. Despite fragmented theoretical evidence
that supports embodiment in a diverse range of contexts,
we suggest that more research is needed in the areas of
psychophysiology and cross-modal correspondence. It
is crucial that deeper knowledge is generated about the
relationship between the brain, body, and environment
in order to avoid introspective phenomenological specu-
lations and untestable theories. Thus, we propose that
weak embodiment is the strongest approach to take.
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